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Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their 
colonies to an exclusive company ... Of all the 
expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the 
natural growth of a new colony, that of an exclusive 
company is undoubtedly the most effectual. 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. (1) 
Introductory Note 
While Adam Smith's indictment on contemporary monopolies, which operated during 
the era of merchant capital dominance, has validity, it cannot be properly 
applied to the British South Africa Compzq (BSA CO) without very important 
qualifications which, in the case of Rhodesian white settlers, largely invalidate 
the indictment. The strictures of this great prophet of capitalism and defender of 
free trade against his contemporary monopolies, and quoted above only in brief, 
however, do to some extent apply to much of the history of BSA CO rule in Northern 
Rhodesia, which the Chartered Company for a long time viewed as a labour reservoir 
for its more prized territory of Southern Rhodesia. Smith's strictures apply even 
more to the Chartered Company's contemporary monopolies, such as the Mozambique and 
the Nyasa Companies in Portuguese East Africa, neither of which can be said to 
have developed the Mozambican economy in any meaningful way. (2) The reasons for 
both Britain and Portugal~s resorting or agreeing to the expediency of chartered 
company colonization lie beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that 
the primary reason was to finance imperialism on the cheap during the scramble for 
Africa in the late 19th century. 
Although settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia has been touched upon 
by historians such as GaM, l'4uzm.y and Palmer ( 3) , none of their works address 
themselves specifically to the development of settler agriculture. This paper 
focuses on the activities of the BSA CO as the power behind the dolonial State in 
the field of agricultural development, and on the development of the Companyfs own 
agricultural enterprises, run by its Commercial Branch. It will be argued that, in 
general, far from stunting the development of Southern Rhodesia, the Company 
instituted measures directed to facilitate economic development under settler and 
Company hegemony. (The focus is on the policies under which white agriculture 
developed.) However, it will also be demonstrated that Company and settler 
interests were not always identical, and that the period of Company rule was 
characterized by a struggle between Company and settler interests, on the one hand, 
and between white and black interests, on the other, and that in the latter case 
the Company nearly always supported settler interests. 
From the outset of Occupation in 1890, African ri&ts to land were written 
off and the land was regarded as the Companyls commercial asset, to be sold to white 
settlers on easy terms. (4) Thus the policy of using settlers as the main agent for 
development and the Company's fiscal and labour policies are central to a coherent 1 understanding of the development of settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia, as I 
, try to demonstrate below. 
I 
i Between Occupation and about 1905, the Companyls efforts were directed at 
1 
l realizing a "Second Rand" in Southern Rhodesia, so much so that for the first two and 
l a half decades after Occupation the mines were largely dependent on African producers 
I for food supplies, (5) As early as 1891 the Companyfs directors had stated that 
llsplendid as are the agricultural prospects of the country, it is to the mineral 
l wealth that the Directors look for the most profitable returns". (6) However, by 
I 1912 the Directors were telling shareholders that "In the early years of the territory 
l the mining industry was the Company's chief care. While this industry continues to 
I receive such assistance as its circumstances require, land is to-day claiming a much 
I greater share of the Company's attention, and the industries connected with it are 
rapidly gaining ground that capital is available for their support." (7) At this 
time the Company started to build bacon factories, creameries and, not long afterwards, 
oil and soap factories,to provide markets for settler agriculture and thereby 
l stimulate pig and dairy farming. Such agricultural industries would not only help to 
lower the cost of living at the mines but also provide the country with export 
l 
I commodities in time. 
The myth of a I1Second Rand" which had survived the first war of Chimurenga 
(~iberation) in 1896-7, and the rail link crisis caused by the -10-Boer War of 1899- 
1901, finally ended with the financial crisis of 1903-4. (8) The post-1908 period up 
to the beginning of World War I has been depicted by Palmer as the phase of the 
"white agricultural policy" (g), different from the period prior to it in that it 
marked the time during which the BSA CO systematically implemented its new policy of 
promoting settler fanning, settlement and agrarian production. The burial of the 
"Second Rand" myth thus gave settler agriculture a tremendous boost as the Company 
began to focus its attention on agricultural development and the realization of "itsf1 
land asset. 
But before examining the development of capitalist agriculture during the 
era of Company rule, it is worth noting the following two points. Capitalism 
developed in Rhodesian agriculture in two w s .  First, by the internal accumulation 
of surplus value. White fanners (and also some black farmers) sought to build up 
resources of capital from profits. White farmers had an advantage, in that there were 
a large number of resources at their disposal (taxes, compulsory labour, pass laws, 
private locations, etc .) by which they could extract surplus value from Africans, who 
increasingly turned into a local rural proletariat. (The contribution of such 
compulsory measures to capitalist agricultural development in Southern Rhodesia has 
been insufficiently recognized in the published literature.) At the same time a large 
corpus of legislation and practice grew up to ensure that African producers did not 
become capitalist farmers competing with settler farmers. The CNC, Herbert Taylor, 
was reflecting government policy when he stated in 1918: "The native should be 
trained not so much as a competitor with the white man in the business of life, but 
as a useful auxiliary to help in the progress of the country." (10) It must be pointed 
out that the estates and ranches set up by the BSA Cols Commercial Branch from about 
l9lO onwards also benefited from the above repressive measures. The white farmers 
have had in this struggle the inestimable advantage of political power, both during 
and after Company rule. Through settler agitation, the number of elected members in 
the Legislative Council rose from 4 (against 7 Company representatives) to 7 (out of 
15) in 1903, and stood at 7 (out of 13) between 1908 and 1913. In 1914 elected 
members held 12 of the 20 seats in the Council. (11) But the influence of settler 
representatives on government policy, especially with rega.rd to labour policies and 
the yearly estimates, is not to be looked at merely in terms of the number of elected 
members vis-a-vis nominated members, since it was in the political interest of the 
Company to carry as much settler support with it as possible. 
Secondly, the penetration of international capital is a major factor in the 
development of capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia. International capital was 
present in Southern Fhodesia in terms of speculative financial investment right from 
the 1890s, in the form of big land grants. (12) The BSA CO Manager noted in 1912 
that the fifteen principal land-owning companies in Southern Rhodesia held over 8 
million acres between them, with the Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia and 
Willoughby's Consolidated CO Ltd owning 1,544,000 acres and 1,339,000 acres, 
respectively. The fact that over 6 million acres of the above land lay within 25 
miles of the railway lines gave this land an added importance and value. (13) It is 
important to note, of course, that the BSA CO, as the largest land owner in the 
country, had a direct role here through its Commercial Branch, which ran large 
estates and ranches. Throughout most of the period of Company rule these big land 
companies, many of which were owned by mining capital, held their land largely for 
speculative purposes. And when they did go in for fanning they tended to limit 
themselves to the country's three major agricultural commodities, viz. maize, tobacco 
and, above all, cattle ranching (which required minimal infrastructure on the farm 
and had an assured market at the local mines and,, from February 1916, on the Rand) .(U) 
There was hostility between settler farmers and the land speculators ri&t from the 
1890s, the former accusing the latter of "locking up" valuable agricultural land and 
African labour, and thereby hindering white immigration. This hostility was manifested 
particularly in the tussles aver the Private Locations Ordinance (1908). One result 
of the promulgation of the above Ordinance was that from about 1910 the State could 
take action against purely speculative interests in land and international capital was 
forced to become productive (to a limited extent). It was partly this move by the 
State at the behest of settler farmers,and the gradual eradication of East Coast 
Fever and other cattle diseases, that gave a spur to large-scale ranching in the 
period prior to the 1921-22 cattle market crisis. (15) 
Capitalist Agriculture Boosted 
Between 1906 and 1912 six major factors together boosted.capitalist 
agriculture, so much so that by the close of the second decade of the 20th century 
settler agriculture had reached a level of self-sufficiency, especially in three of 
the country's agricultural commodities, viz. maize, tobacco and cattle, and had begun 
to penetrate external markets in the sub-continent and even overseas, in the case of 
maize, tobacco and citrus fruits. The six factors are the Wise Report of 1906, the 
1907 visit to Southern Rhodesia by a committee of the BSA CO Board of Directors, 
headed by Henry Birchenough, the reorganization of the Agricultural Department under 
the directorship of Dr Ekic Nobbs in 1908, the promulgation of the Private Locations 
Ordinance (PLO) in 1908, the Company's embarkation on a policy of developing its own 
estates and ranches "on strictly commercial lines for profitf1, and the establishment 
of the Land Bank in 1912. These factors are now discussed in turn. 
C. D, Wise, an experienced British agriculturalist and the Company's land 
settlement expert, left the UK for Southern Rhodesia in October 1905, with 
instructions from the Board l1to report generally upon the current and future prospects 
of the agricultural industry, the opportunities for new settlers, and the methods by 
which cultivating owners could be best established upon the soilI1. (16) The Directors 
were impressed by Wise's report and asked him to return to Southern Rhodesia to start 
operations and prepare a Central Farm on one of the areas selected for settlement, '!for 
the purpose of receiving and training settlers11 in general, in accordance with the 
methods submitted in his report. The Directors expounded a bold settlement policy to 
their shareholders: "It will be the Company's aim to assist settlers to take up 
farms already prepared for their occupation, by the support and facilities offered 
them, rather than by giving them raw land at prairie valuef1 (17), although the 
Company would not suspend the sale of unimproved land outside the settled areas for 
settlement. Each district taken up for settlement was to have an experimental farm 
financed by a special grant from the Administration to assist experimental work, such 
as trials and selection of seeds and trials of insecticides, under the auspices of the 
Agricultural Department. The Department would disseminate the experimental results 
in the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, and invite farmers to inspect the trial grounds. 
As Wise himself had noted, "A great advantage in carrying out such trials on the 
Central Farm is that the farms will be in different parts of the country, and 
experiments will therefore be more valuable, being carried out under local conditions 
of that particular dis tric tfl. (18) The earliest Central ~arms/~x~erimental Farms were 
established on the Salisbury Commonage, at the Company's Mazoe and Premier estates 
and Marandellas farm. (19) 
Assistance to new settlers would include, inter alia, assisted sea passage 
and free rail passage to Southern Rhodesia, temporary accommodation and opportunities 
for practical experience, and a proportion of land to be cultivated before the arrival 
of the settler and assistance in providing stock. The Directors also took up Wise's 
recommendation to urge co-operation among settler fanners for the purchase and sale 
of agricultural materials and produce, and the construction of better roads to connect 
farming districts such as Melsetter, Ehkeldoorn and Victoria to the railway lines, Ifto 
enable them to go aheadt1. But perhaps the most important of Wisefs recommendations 
adopted by the Company was that the Company should "dispose of their land to the first 
settlers at a low but fair rate, according to the market value of the land in the 
country to-dq, reserving, however, alternate blocks [to be sold later when prices had 
risen]: they should assist these men as far as possible in reason, without spoon- 
feeding and make them successful as their success will mean the success of land 
settlement and the development of the country". In the next few years the Company 
resorted to the simple expedient of reducing the minimum price of land to 1/6d a 
morgen. (20) 
The declaration of policy issued to settlers at Bulawayo in October 1907 by 
the Visiting Commission of Directors further confirmed the Company's adoption of Wise's 
recommendations. The Commission stated that the Company intended to pursue an active 
and forward commercial policy, and to stimulate in every possible way the opening up 
of and steady development of the mineral and agricultural resources of the country. (21) 
As the Directors told shareholders, the time had arrived for the adoption of a 
vigorous policy of development upon broad lines and the Company would incur expenditure 
in all the above directions: 
The return for expenditure so incurred is to be 
looked for, not only in direct profits, but also in 
the natural development resulting from an increase 
of population, which will bring about the occupation 
and settlement of vast areas now lying idle, increase 
In order to encourage further land settlement, the visiting Commission proposed (a) 
as noted above, to reduce the price of land and (b) to accept cash payments for land 
where there was a reasonable guarantee of genuine occupation. Further, the Company 
undertook to p w  rebates on the purchase price of farms where improvements had been 
carried out, in the form of fencing, tree planting and general cultivation. In order 
to carry out the Company's new policy, the Directors proposed the immediate issuing 
of 3 million new shares. 
The reorganization of the Agricultural Department in 1908 by Dr Eric Nobbs, 
an agricultural scientist from the Cape, who served as Director of Agriculture between 
1908 and 1923, revolutionized the functions of the Department, thus giving a boost to 
capitalist agriculture. The reorganization was planned to increase the Department's 
administrative efficiency as well as its scientific activities. From this period on, 
the Department consistently increased its number of agriculturalists, tobacco and 
cotton experts, veterinary officers, agricultural scientists, etc. In addition to 
conducting experiments and disseminating the results to farmers, these experts went 
out to farms regularly to give on-the-spot advice to settler farmers. Dr Nobbs 
regarded such visits as the most effective method of getting progressive ideas across 
to farmers in a new country "with a population so largely composed of newcomers, many 
of them without any agricultural experience . . .I1 (23) Such free state provision of 
scientific and technical services to settler farmers must be regarded as an important 
form of capital made available to settler farmers. 
The Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) (24), which was modelled on the Cape 
legislation, had its roots in the demand of the Matabeleland branch of the Rhodesia 
Land Owners1 and Farmers! Association to the visiting BSA CO Directors in 1907 that 
legislation be enacted on the lines recommended by the South African Native Affairs 
Commission (1903-5), to restrict African occupation of white-owned land. The 
Ordinance limited the number of African adult males on a 1,500 morgen farm to 40, and 
stipulated the number of months! work the tenant had to work for his landlord at 
current rates of wages. As the Rhodesia Herald reported Attorney General Tredgold's 
speech in the Legislative Council: 
There were two ideas which must be prominent in all 
such legislation: one was that the occupier of l&, 
farm owner or any other person whom it may be, should 
not be deprived of a reasonable quantity of labour 
for the carrying out of such work as he was doing. 
The other extreme was that the owner should not 
congregate upon his land so many natives that the 
land could not support them, and they thereby become 
a great nuisance to neighbours, by living and preying 
on the surrounding country. (25) 
It hardly needs to be said that Tredgoldfs second reason for the Ordinance 
was largely an ideological justification for the first. As Tredgold himself stated, 
he was in total agreement with the conclusion of the South African Native Affairs 
Commission that the system of allowing large numbers of Africans on white-owned land 
and llKaffir farmingf1 llrestricts the supply of labour; that it fills up with natives 
much land which would otherwise be better utilized and developed, and it leads to the 
absence of due control over themt1. (26) The PLO attacked I1Kaffir farmerslt , i.e. those 1 
rentier landlords and share-cropping inte.rests who were extracting capital from l 
Africans living on their land in the form of money rents and agricultural produce, by l 
charging 1s and 5s annually per contract for bona fide farmers actually occupying the 
land and absentee landlords, respectively. ( 2 m b o v e  section of the PLO was 
bitterly opposed (without success) by land-owning interests in the Chamber of Mines, 
who argued that if it was a question of revenue, as it appeared to them, "it would be 
better to raise such revenue by the direct taxation of the natives rather than by 
throwing on the large landowners the odium of increased taxation and disturbance of 
rightsf1. (28) Settler demands for the PLO and the opposition to it by rentier and 
share-cropping interests must be viewed in the light of the penetration of finance 
capital into land. Such penetration led to the accumulation of large estates for 
speculative purposes, and hence also the rise of rent-tenancy and share-cropping and 
the hostility of the more commercialized settler farmers to both casual labour tenancy 
agreements and to the rentier landlords for lllocking upf1 land and African labour. In 
some areas the PLO merely legalized a practice that had been gaining gmund for some 
time. As the CNC, Matabeleland, reported in 1907, llAgreements between owners of 
farms and natives occupying them are becoming more general, but, in many instances, 
natives prefer moving to the Reserves to binding themselves to any definite 
contractf1. (29) It must be pointed out, however, that the less capitalized farmers 
neither initiated nor accepted the PLO voluntarily, and, in fact, those in areas such 
as Melsetter fought a rear-guard battle against the P M  well after the promulgation of 
the Ordinance. By 1916, the CNC could report that the Ordinance had had a f'good 
effectf1 on labour supply, as a whole, in that 1,100 locations had been established 
under Section 3 of the Ordinance. (30) 
Although the Company Government started giving out funds to settler farmers 
in the form of fencing loans as early as 1904, there was no proper institution for the 
first 22 years of Company rule to enable farmers to borrow money on easy terms, to 
employ in a wide range of agricultural activities. By 1907 settler representatives 
in the Legislative Council were demanding that the Government establish a Land Bank, 
"to assist farmers with loans for purchasing stock, agricultural machinery, seeds and 
generally with a view to stimulating and encouraging the farming industrylf . (31) 
Partly as a result of settler pressure and partly out of the desire to attract new 
settlers and to diversify the countryts agricultural production and thereby indirectly 
profit from higher land prices and increased rai1wa;y freight, the Company set up a 
Land Bank in 1912, with a share capital of £250,000. Approved applicants could get 
up to a maximum of £2,000 on first mortgage over landed property or on deposit of 
other approved security. (32) 
R e p m n t  of capital was spread over-a period of 10 years and the annual 
interest rate of 65 was below what commercial banks were charging. The Land Bank's 
policy, like that of the much larger Land. and Agricultural Bank, created by the new 
all-settler government in 1924, was to make credit facilities "available for persons 
of European descent only". (33) 
Direct BSA CO involvement in agricultural production started with the 
setting up of Central Famm under the management of C. D. Wise at the end of 1906, af 
Marandellas, and later on at Sinoia, Mazoe and Premier estates. By early 1912 the 
Company was also operating Rhodesdale Estate (in the Hartley district), which 
consisted of 95,305 acres, forming part of 118,000 acres taken over in satisfaction 
of a debt of £4,698 owed by the French South African Development CO Ltd, and had 
acquired other farms which were being farmed on a half-share agreement with the 
Company. (34) The latter farms included the Mazoe Citrus Farm (owned by the Masoe 
syndicate), in which the Company had bought a one-third share interest in l909 SLnd 
which the Company soon virtually owned. 
Despite the financial, administrative and technical weaknesses of the early 
history of the Central Farms in 1910, Marandellas and Premier Estate produced 
tobacco worth £2,000 and £800, respectively, and in lgll P. S. Inskipp, the Commercial 
Representative, could state that the three farms at Sinoia, Marandellas and Premier 
Estate were self-supporting. (35) Additional tobacco plantations were being 
established on all three estates as the Company set out to promote tobacco culture in 
the country. Early in 1910, for example, the Tobacco Company of Rhodesia and South 
Africa Ltd, itself a subsidiary of the BSA CO, was formed to take over the operations 
of the BSA CO in connection with the purchase and sale of Rhodesian tobacco, 
including the leases of the tobacco warehouses which the Chartered Company had built 
for the llscientificll handling of the country's tobacco output. The new company also 
acquired 'Ithe right to select a total of 30,000 acres of land suitable for tobacco 
cultivation". ( $ ) 
In l9lO the BSA CO became the first landowner in the country to develop 
citrus culture on a commercial scale, first at the Mazoe Estate and not long 
afterwards at Premier aYld Sinoia Estates, and to a lesser extent at the Marandellas 
farm. In January 1912, the six farms being worked wholly by the Company totalled 
76,150 acres, 1,418 of which were under cultivation. In addition to the above, 
6,118 acres at Sinoia and 73,941 acres at Rhodesdale were being used for grazing. (37) 
The Rhodesdale Estate, which was enlarged to over 1 million acres, developed into one 
of the Compamy's important ranches during the second decade of the 20th century, and 
had on it 40,000 head of cattle by 1923. (38) 
1 B o m  about l9lO the Companyls policy towards the Central Farms began to 
1 change from regarding them as mere training centres for settlers. As the Directors 
1 reported to the shareholders, "The primary object in the working of these estates is 
1 
1 the earning of profits, but their use for secondary objects,such as the training of 
settlers, is not lost sight oft1. (39) While increased settler immigration would 
result in increased land purchases and, therefore, increased profits for the Company, 
by improving the undeveloped land and showing that good profits could be made the 
Company could send up the price which it could later ask for the remaining so-called 
unalienated land (i.e. land which had been expropriated but not yet granted to 
individuals or companies by the BSA CO). The above view was reinforced by a 1912 
memorandum by H. Wilson Fox, the Companyl S manager and financial expert. (40) In a 
1904 report commissioned by the Company, Lt-Col Owen Thomas stated that (at that time) 
the case for agriculture as a leading national industry of Southern Rhodesia could 
not be demonstrated to the serious agriculturalist. "I frankly admit my failure to 
solve the problem of success in agriculture in Rhodesia, except as a minor adjunct of 
stock-farming; but I ... recognize the immense su i tabi l i ty  of that  country 
fo r  the pastoral branch of husbandry." (41) Another expert employed by the ~ompahy, 
Professor Wallace of Edinburgh University, a special is t  on m a l  economics, reported 
i n  1908 that,  "As a supplementary branch of rural  industry on livestock f a m s  there 
i s  much scope fo r  agricultural extension, but as a primary means by which the country 
as a whole m a y  be developed, agriculture pure and simple is  quite out of the 
question". (42) The Director of Ag~iculture added weight to  the above conclusions 
when he reported a t  the end of l g l l  that Rhodesia was llessentially a stock country. 
The conditions of the country point strongly to  meat as  the principal ultimate product 
to be elaborated off [sic] our veld . . . Axable farming must rank below stock farming 
in importance, prof i tab i l i ty  and usefulness. (43) 
Fox concluded from the above reports and others that ,  i f  land i n  Southern I 
Rhodesia wme to  be valued according to  the return which could, on average, be derived I 
from it when employed f o r  the purpose it was best adapted, "that value must primarily 
be determined with the reference to i ts  value as a stock-raising country". Fox argued, 
and the Board agreed, that  land must be regarded as the Company's principal asset,  l 
taking priori ty over the Company's two other major assets,  minerals and railways, and 1 l 
was to be developed " w i t h  the object of making the maximum prof i t  f o r  i ts  owners". (44) 
He argued that even a t  as low a figure as  5s per acre the Company's land assets,  north 
and south of the Zambezi, amounted to  over £20 million, "a sum higher than I can 
assign t o  the Companyfs mining and railway interests  combined on the best assumptions 
that on present knowledge I fee l  just i f ied i n  making". Another Director, Lord 
Winchester, reinforced the above view when he stated in a memorandum the following 
year that the Chartered Company's Mines and Development CO had already spent 
£20,000 without any definite results.  "If t h i s  £20,000 had been expended i n  the 
improvement of, SW, 10 farms, I think it would have made a be t te r  return, taking into 
consideration the value which each s e t t l e r  is  to  both the Customs and Railway 
receipts. (45) 
Fox reminded h i s  fellow Directors that ,  "speaking politically", time was 
running out f o r  the Company and that it w a s  a case of now or  never. The Company could 
not prove or  real ize the t rue value of i ts  estate  by establishing a few highly 
developed estates,  small i n  area, which no one would accept as  samples of the country 
a t  large, or  by se l l ing  land on a large scale a t  low prices. The Company had already 
alienated 16 million acres in  the most accessible d i s t r i c t s  "for practically nothing 
so f a r  as  cash return i s  concerned and yet  th i s  land remains i n  comparatively few 
hands, and the greater proportion of it is  undevelopedw. (46) I n  May 1911, only 
2,140 whites were engaged i n  agricultural pursuits, and Fox gave a l ibe ra l  estimate 
of 5,000 whites upon the land, out of a white population of 23,606. Between January 
1908 and July 1912 the Company i t s e l f  had se t t led  2,849 persons on 5,210,549 acres. 
Clearly the Company's policy of closer settlement, designed t o  l i m i t  farm sizes and 
to  raise the land prices, was not producing the anticipated resul ts  and had i n  fac t  
met with popular disfavour among se t t le rs .  Fox argued f o r  a more comprehensive policy 
by which the value of the Company's vast land holdings of pra i r ie  land could be 
conclusively demonstrated. How was th i s  t o  be done? "My answerf1, Fox stated, "is 
by u t i l i s ing  i t s e l f  large areas of average land fo r  the purpose of which it is  best 
suited, viz. stock raisingt1 (47), which would have the secondary effect  of taming 
land, especially outside the 25-mile railway zone, and therefore of rais ing i t s  value 
when l a t e r  taken up by new se t t le rs .  Fox recommended tha t  £ l  million be earmarked 
fo r  expenditure on f ive ranches of 500,000 acres each, of which four were to  be i n  
Southern Rhodesia and one i n  the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The Central Farm a t  
Rhodesdale was to  be up-graded into a ranch and the four ranches i n  Southern Rhodesia 
were to  be developed i n  such a way as  t o  be mly stocked by the end of 1920. (W) 
In the memorandum of June 1913, Fox repeated h i s  c a l l  for  the vigorous 
prosecution of the Company's ranching policy and l i s t ed  four areas of policy. 
Theee were tha t  the Company should (a) develop estates,  e.g. c i t rus  estates; [:P)
develop irr igable land "on business l ines,  the object i n  each case t o  make a profi t  
on the sale  of improved land1'; (c) that  the above estates  should provide young 
European se t t l e r s  with the opportunity of working f o r  w a g e s ,  before launching out on 
the i r  own account as  tenants o r  proprietors - a system that  had already been t r i e d  i n  
tobacco growing by Major Frank Johnson a t  the Inyoka Estate i n  present-day Gokwe 
d i s t r i c t .  But there would be "no room f o r  trade union wages i n  such cases" (50); and 
(d) Fox urged, and the Company agreed, to breed dairy and other cattle for sale to 
settlers. Although not all Fox's recommendations were fully implemented by the time 
the Privy Council gave its ruling on land ownership in 1918, by the close of Company 
rule, apart from owning extensive ranches, the Company had planted 62,000 citrus trees 
at its Mazoe Estate, 11,000 at Premier and 8,000 at Sinoia, had built irrigation works 
at all three estates and had started to sell small irrigable holdin@ on these estates 
to settler farmers for citrus culture. (51) 
It is largely in the li&t of the above policies that the Company's 
involvement in agricultural production and in the promotion of settler agriculture in 
Southern Rhodesia can be properly understood. However, it is important to remember 
that the above policies were given added impetus by increasing settler demands for a 
vigorous settlement policy. As Fox, Birchenough and other Company officials reported, 
settlers were constantly complaining that industry was languishing and that the cost 
of living was excessive "and ri&tly attribute these evils to the scanty number of the 
European population". (52) The Company's decision in 1907 to separate its 
administrative and commercial functions as from 1908 gave added impetus to the 
controversy over land ownership, a controversy that was to influence Company-settler 
relations until the ruling of the Privy Council in 1918, that the unalienated land 
neither belonged to the Company, the settlers, nor to the African people, but to the 
Crown. (53) Settler representatives complained bitterly that monies from land sales 
and certain revenues (e.g. rents charged on Africans living on unalienated land and 
fines and rents from white landowners and tax on the mines) raised under the taxes 
and tariffs of the country were going into the Company's coffers instead of the 
development of the country. Thus in 1908 the 7 elected members forced a resolution 
through the Legislative Council, demanding that the Imperial Government adjudicate 
between the settlers and the Company 
(a) with re& to the claim of the BSA CO to be the 
private owners of all unalienated land in S. Rhodesia; 
(b) as to what imports or charges levied under the 
authority of Ordinances or other laws, constitute 
administrative revenue, and what expenditure should be 
charged against such revenue, 
as, in the circumstances, the resolution stated, it was impossible for the Council 
to deal properly with the budgets submitted by the Administration. (54) It was in 
pad in reaction to such settler agitation that Fox and Birchenough stressed the 
importance of time in the Company's realization of its land asset, lest the Imperial 
Government rule against the Company's claim. Hence the recommendations that the 
Company itself go in for extensive agricultural production and promotion of settler 
agriculture. 
State Aid and Settler Extraction of Surplus Value from Africans 
The Company's policy towards land settlement was that settlers should be of 
the "right stamp", i.e. men with capital. C. D. Wise had recommended in 1906 that the 
average settler should have at least £700. This amount included passage out, erection 
of temporary accommodation, furniture, implements, harness, stock, seed, wages, poultry, 
rent, food and £70 for extras. (55) The Directors reported in 1908 that an increasing 
number of well-to-do persons were leaving the UK to settle in Southern Rhodesia. 
Statistics seemed to validate the Company's optimism: in 1908 the Company's Estates 
Department placed 949 persons on the land, with an average capital per family of £800. 
By 1913 the average capital per family had risen to £1,240. (56) 
A very important source of agricultural capital inflow were the ranching 
companies which invested substantially in the cattle industry between 1910 and 1914. 
As the Director of Agriculture reported in 1912, ranches "varying as a rule from 
10,000 acres to 50,000 acres or thereabouts" were being developed all over the country, 
using African cattle as the foundation stock, supplemented in some cases by grade 
stock from South Africa as well as pedigree stock from overseas. (57) A BSA CO 
shareholder who visited the country in l9lO reported that llThere are a number of men 
who have made money at mining and are putting it into ranchingt1. (58) Some 
companies such as Willoughby's had been involved in ranching almost from the time of 
Occupation, but in 1912 Dr Nobbs was commenting on the "new feature ... that several 
companies have been formed during the year, and these and others are embarking upon 
operations on a large scaleu. The ei&t companies listed by Nobbs included Liebigs 
and the BSA CO itself. All eight companies possessed at least several hundred 
thousand acres, while Liebigs, the Amamgdmated Properties of Rhodesia and Willou&lby's 
held well over a million acres each. (59) By 1912 the BSA Cols Rhodesdale Ranch had 
been extended to over a million acres, and 31 l!fa.~?~h l9U carried over 19,000 head of 
cattle. The 100,000 acre Tokwe Ranch was being used principally as a collecting depot 
and carried 4,914 head, while the Company's 3,590,000 acre Nuanetsi Ranch carried 
4,524 head and the Company intended to develop it Ifas rapidly as possible". By 1920 
Rhodesdale and Nuanetsi ranches, which by now covered 1,017,216 acres and 2,258,165 
acres, respectively, carried a total of 88,487 head of cattle. 
But the inflow of settler and finance capital was not eno-. Most settlers 
on the land did not come from the monied classes in the UK. They came from South 
Africa, as was also probably true of Kenya during the immediate post-Anglo-Boer war 1 1 
period. The white population rose rapidly between 1904 (12,596) and 1911 (23,606), ! 
and especially during the period 1907-1911, and stood at 33,620 by 1921. Between 1904 
and 1911 agricultural production more than doubled, involving 879 white males in the l 
earlier year and 2,067 in the latter one. Furthermore, the agricultural proportion l , 
of thetotal white population increased at a higher rate than any other occupational 
class among whites. (60) By l9ll only Wh of the farming population of Southern 
l 
Rhodesia had come directly from the UK, and in 1913 nearly 95% of the white farmers 
had come from South Africa. (61) 
The Company's policy of keeping impecunious settlers out, especially "low 
Dutcht1, was never pursued with vigour, as the continued growth of the Afrikaner 
ITlepublic of Enkeldoornw clearly demonstrates. (62) There were thus a large number 
of settler farmers throughout the period of Company rule with insufficient capital to 
farm on a large scale under Rhodesian conditions. Thus both settler farmers and the 
land companies were involved in Marxls llso-called primitive accumulation" (63) of 
capital through the exploitation of African land, cattle, labour, and the extraction of 
capital through rents. However, since settler agriculture in Southern Rhodesia 
hardly has what can be called "a peasant history", it seems to me more correct to see 
primitive accumulation not as a point of departure for the capitalist mode of production, 
as Marx correctly observed in the case of Europe, but as occurring (almost?) 
simultaneously with capitalist agricultural development. This becomes apparent when 
the crucial role of the state in the development of settler capitalist agriculture in 
Southern Rhodesia is examined. 
Primitive capital accumulation in Southern Rhodesia went on throughout the 
period of Company rule in varying degrees. The period was characterized by the violent 
struggle of the growing capitalism against African subsistence and incipient peasant 
producers. Repressive legislation ranging from Pass Laws, the PLO, to the Native 
Labour Contracts Legislation Ordinance was enacted to facilitate settler exploitation 
of African labour. Roder has observed that 
The moment a man pegged his farm, he regarded the 
African villagers on it,as his serfs, who would 
have to work for him. The chief means of mobilising 
this pool of labour in the first years was the 
sjambok or hippo-hide whip, and after 1908 labour 
agreements which committed tenants to work several 
months, usually three, for the privilege of remaining 
on their ancestral land. (64) 
In periods of severe labour shortage, settler farmers were able to flex their political 
muscles and force the Company Government to institute measures designed to procure 
labour more quickly than the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau. Thus, in September 1911, 
settler farmers held a mass demonstration in Salisbury and passed, inter alia, a 
resolution demanding the Government I1to supply at once a minimum number of boys, 
sufficient to relieve temporarily an unprecedented crisis which otherwise will prove 
the ruin of the whole of the farming community11. (65) The government responded 
positively by instructing Native Commissioners llto place the position before their 
Chiefs" (66), which meant using Chiefs to force ~theirl~subjects into contract labour 
on settler farms. 
Settler farmers and land companies also charged their African tenants rents, 
grazing and dipping fees, etc., which,the CNC was to report in 1926, were so 
exhorbitant that "within a few years [they went] far towards paying the purchase price 
of the farmll. In 1909 and 1910, for example, the BSA Cols Lands Department collected 
£18,653 and £35,422 revenue, respectively. African rents, which were not included in 
the above figures, amounted to £9,863 and £9,316, respectively, for the two financial 
years. llThe small decrease in native rents1', the Commercial Representative explained 
in 1911, "was due to the fact that on a sale of land taking place the rents pass to 
the purchaser. l1 (67) 
'l'hrougl~ its control of State revenue, the Company Government diverted funds 
from African taxation to settler agriculture in the form of experimental stations/fams, 
technical and scientific provision and advice, loans for fencing, purchase of grade 
and pedigree stock, the construction of dipping tanks, etc. In the 1909-10 financial 
year, for example, African taxes and fees totalled £209,423 but the expenditure of the 
Native Department for the same period was only £52,640. (68) The African contribution 
to State coffers, and therefore indirectly to settler agriculture, was succinctly 
noted by the Acting Controller of Customs and Excise in 1918: 
... I do not think that the public realises sufficiently 
what a valuable asset the native in this country is to 
the Customs revenue. When it is borne in mind, for 
instance, that for each foreign blanket purchased by the 
native he pays indirectly in respect of Customs duty a 
quarter of the home cost, and in the case of a 
British blanket a fifth, some idea mqq perhaps be 
gathered as to the result native purchase has on the 
revenue of this country. (69) 
Since African labour was "the basis of the economic fabrict1 (70) and even by the close 
of Company rule was being paid only 10s to £1 in cash per month, plus rations 
(costing about 7/6 per month) (71), in agriculture, and the settler farmer tended "to 
become purely an overseerp1 (TZ' ) ,  the African contribution to settler and state capital 
accumulation went well beyond the payment of taxes and customs duties. 
At the end of Company rule in 1923, Southern Rhodesials white population had 
grown to 36,183; settler maize production had surpassed one and a half million 
(200 lb) bags, and the country had become a net exporter of maize; the tobacco 
industry, which had suffered a market crisis between 1914 and 1918, had recovered from 
the 1914 low figure of 426,423 lbs and had surpassed the 1913-14 record harvest of 
just over 3 million lbs, to 3,878,460 lbs in the 1923-24 season. (73) Citrus export 
(mainly from the Company's estates), which started in a small way with 1,334 boxes 
during 1916, had risen to 52,961 boxes by 1924. (74) The number of cattle belonging 
to settler farmers and land companies, which was estimated at only 110,000 in l9lO 
(when African-owned cattle were officially put at !!not less than 261,000~~), had risen 
to about half of the countryls estimated 2 million cattle by the end of 1923. Cattle 
exports to the Rand (and, to a limited extent, to the Congo and ~ozambique) started 
in 1916, with 12,815 cattle, rose to 37,285 in 1920, fell to 12,408 in the 1921 slump, 
but by the end of 1923 had risen again to 34,841. (75) In addition to building branch 
railway lines to such districts as Mazoe, Sinoia and Victoria, the government had 
advanced grants to Road Councils to improve transport facilities. 
The settlers had not simply "carved farms out of the bush" and reached the 
above hi& levels of production through individual genius and effort. As this paper 
has attempted to demonstrate, state aid in various forms to capitalist agriculture in 
Southern Rhodesia was crucial from the earliest days of its development. In 1913 Fox 
reminded fellow directors of the great competition Rhodesia was facing from the older 
colonies for settlers of the llri&t stampt1, and stated that the country had to be 
satisfied with something less than the best, "and devote special attention ... to the 
working up of settler material. It must therefore give Inexperienced men of suitable 
qualities and dispositions,opportunities of establishing themselves upon the land". 
Such a policy has, in fact, characterized much of the history of white agriculture in 
Rhodesia. 
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